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AN ANOMALY IN MINING LAW
By Chief Justice Theodore Brantly, Supreme Court of Montana,.
Title to mineral land containing quartz deposits is acquired by
discovery of a ledge or vein therein and location of it in compli-
ance with the federal statute and local laws and customs not 
in-
consistent therewith. The location followed by a fulfilment 
by
the locator of all the conditions subsequent entitles him to 
demand
a patent. It has always been the policy of the Congress, 
with
reference to lands other than those containing quartz deposits, 
to
vest in the patentee the entire interest, making no reservation 
of
any kind either in favor of the government or for any other 
pur-
pose. This policy has been consistently pursued, except that 
the
legislation providing for, the disposition of agricultural lands
overlying coal measures, authorizes patent to issue to the agricul-
tural claimant for the surface only.'
Speaking generally, a patent is a common law grant. The title
conveyed by a patent to a quartz claim, however, is in some cases
greater, and in others less, than that conveyed by a common law
grant, dependent upon subsurface conditions. If the vein on its
descent into the earth departs from a perpendicular course it must
finally pass into adjoining ground. The condition of parallelism
in the end lines of the claim being present, the right to pursue the
vein extralaterally is included in the grant.
2 Thus a servitude in
favor of a mining claim is imposed upon an adjoining claim into
which the vein departs extralaterally, it also being subject to a
like servitude in favor of an adjoining owner who has extra-
lateral rights. Where there are cross-veins, priority of title gov-
erns, but the holder of the junior title has a right of way through
the space of intersection for the purpose of working his vein.8
This provision imposes a servitude upon the senior claim, but does
not otherwise affect the exclusive right of 
the senior claimant.
4
Within these, and perhaps other similar limitations, the owners of
' 32 St. at Large, 388; 36 Id., 583.
2 U. S. Rev. Stat, Sec. 3220.
8 U S. Rev. Stat., Sec. 2336.
4 Calhoun Gold Min. Co. v. Ajax Mitt. Co., x82 U. S., 505.
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mining claims hold them subject to the incidents of ownership and
possession at common law.5
With these matters every lawyer who has given attention to the
provisions of the statute regulating the disposition of mineral
lands and the decisions of the courts thereunder, is familiar. They
are mentioned in order to make clear tht point which it is the
purpose of this discussion to illustrate. Section 2322, U. S. Rev.
Stat., provides: "The locators of all mining locations heretofore
made or which shall hereafter be made, on any mineral vein,
lode or ledge, situated on the public domain, their heirs and as-
signs, where no adverse claim exists on the tenth day of May,
1872, so long as they comply with the laws of the United States,
and with state, territorial, and local regulations not in conflict with
the laws of the United States governing their possessory title,
shall have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all
the surface included within the lines of their locations, and of all
veins, lodes and ledges throughout their entire depth, the top or
apex of which lies inside of such surface lines extended down-
ward vertically, although such veins, lodes or ledges may so far
depart from a perpendicular in their course downward as to ex-
tend outside the vertical side lines of such surface locations."
The right acquired by the location has always been held to be
property of the highest character, and may be protected from tres-
pass by any suitable remedy. The legal title is held by the gov-
ernment in trust for the locator or his vendee. Its power of dis-
position is exhausted.6
In the Del Monte Case,7 the Supreme Court held that the lines
of a junior location may be "laid within, upon or across the sur-
face of a valid senior location for the purpose of defining for
or securing to such junior location underground or extralateral
rights not in conflict with any rights of the senior location." Since
it is the special prerogative of that tribunal to construe the Acts
of Congress, the scope and meaning assigned to them by it must
be the guide to state courts when they come to apply them.8 In
its decision the court recognized the doctrine that in construing
5 Parrott Silver & C. Co. v. Heinze, 25 Mont., 504; Doc v. Waterloo
Min. Co., 54 Fed., 985; St. Louis Min. Co. v. Montana Min. Co., 194
U. S., 235.
6 Noyes v. Mantle, 127 U. S., 351; Clipper Min. Co. v. Eli Min. Co.,
194 U. S., 226.
7 Del Monte M. & M. Co. v. Last Chance M. & Mf. Co., 171 U. S., 55.
s Calhoun Gold Min. Co. v. Ajax Min. Co., x82 U S., 497.
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the statute, the question is not what according to equitable 
prin-
ciples the locator ought to have under his location, 
but whether
he has complied with the statute under any reasonable 
and fair
construction of it. In other words, there is no 
right unless it is
in terms granted by the statute.' It also reaffirmed 
the doctrine
that one locator cannot initiate a right by encroaching 
upon the
surface of a valid and subsisting location belonging to another,
because the encroachment is a trespass. It then proceeded 
to hold
that the overlapping location is not void, but that by 
virtue of the
parallelism of its end lines, secured by means of 
the apparent
appropriation of land already appropriated by others, 
the owner
is entitled to extralateral subsurface rights which he 
would not
have acquired if he had not laid his boundaries as he did; that is,
"within, upon or across the surface of a senior location." This
conclusion was induced by knowledge of the conditions 
actually
existent in mining districts, such as the rough and uneven 
nature
of the country, the confusion and haste often incident 
to the mak-
ing of locations when deposits are discovered in new districts,
the irregularity in the course of the vein or veins, the 
likelihood
of mistakes in laying boundary lines, and the like, all 
of which
must have been foreseen and expected by the Congress 
when it
formulated the legislation, as in the opinion of the court 
is evi-
denced by the fact that it made provision for the adjustment 
of
conflicting claims."
0 The court seems also to have been influenced
somewhat by the consideration that the legal title to 
a mining
claim does not pass from the government until the issuance 
of
patent, and until that time arrives Congress retains 
a certain
measure of control, though this notion is not in accord 
with its
prior decisions. It is not the purpose to question the soundness 
of
the conclusion reached by the court. In view of the definite 
re-
quirement that parallel end lines are a necessary prerequisite 
to
extralateral subsurface rights and the conditions known 
to be
prevalent in the mining districts, the rule as announced 
was
adopted because it seemed more nearly in conformity with 
the
spirit of the mining statute. The only other concluision possible
was, that all overlapping locations are void, and hence the further
conclusion that the federal government cannot, without additional
legislation, dispose of the valuable extralateral rights which 
ap-
OBelk v. Meagher, 115 U. S., 45; Iron Silver Min. Co. %,. 
Elgin Min.
Co., 118 U. S., i96; King v. Anty Min. Co., 152 U. S., 272.
IOU. S. Rev. Stat., Secs. 2325, 2326.
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pertain to so much of the apex of a vein as is found within the
boundaries of an irregularly shaped piece of mineral land. Yet
the rule as stated does not dispose of the difficulty even where the
overlapping claims are not patented. It does not go to the extent
of declaring that the junior location may overlap the senior loca-
tion despite objection on the part of the owner-in other words,
that the right to overlap is one conferred by law and may be en-
forced by judicial process or otherwise. It is often the case that
the senior locator does object and sustains his objection by force
of arms. Ile knows that upon application for patent the junior,
locator will in all likelihood test the validity of his location by an
adverse suit, with its attendant expense and vexatious delay, or
that he will himself be compelled to resort to one, to prevent the
junior locator from taking from him the area embraced in the
overlap. So that, as the law now stands, the power of the officers
of the Interior Department to dispose of the values found in the
extralateral portions of the vein is dependent upon the consent or
want of objection on the part of the owner or owners whose claims
surround the irregularly shaped area. The subjoined diagram,
though it does not represent a concrete case, serves for the pur-
pose of illustration (see next page) :
Suppose the vein departs in the direction of Claim 4. Suppose
that A owns Claims I, 2, 3 and 4, not patented, and that B
desires to locate the enclosed triangle g, h, i, so as to secure the
extralateral rights appertaining to the portion of the apex of the
vein included within it. He cannot do so without setting his
monuments and laying his lines upon A's claims. He wishes to
place his monuments at the points a, b, c, d. If A objects and
enforces his objection, he must either bound his claim so as to in-
clude only the triangular area and forego claim to the extra-
lateral portion of the vein, or he must lay his end lines parallel
with the end lines of either Claim 2 or 3 (for illustration, e, f. and
g, i), thus excluding a triangle equivalent to the area e, f, h, to-
gether with the mineral contained in it. In the first case the
extralateral rights excluded will belong to A by reason of his
ownership of the surface of Claim 4, or the title to them will
remain in the federal government. In the second case, the mineral
included within the perpendicular planes bounding the surface of
the triangle e, f, h, will remain unappropriated and not subject
to appropriation, because no portion of the apex is left, and under
the provisions of the statute as they now are, some portion of the
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apex is necessary to authorize a location. And, though this were
not so, the extralateral portion beyond the line hf cannot be appro-
priated, with the result that it remains unappropriated or belongs
to A by reason of his right to the surface of Claim 4, and conse-
quently his prima facie right to everything beneath. Suppose
Claims i, 2, 3 and 4 are patented. They are not subject to
any control by Congress. B cannot then go upon any of
A 's claims for any purpose except by A's consent. He cannot,
therefore, appropriate the extralateral portions of the vein ex-
cept by A's acquiescence. If this is so, then the federal govern-
ment owns property which it cannot dispose of without the con-
sent of a private citizen-a proposition the soundness of which
once admitted, destroys the conception of sovereignty altogether.
And yet it was actually assumed to be sound, by the Secretary of
the Interior in his decision in the case of Hidee Gold Mining
Company,1 for the point decided is stated in the headnote as
follows: "The location lines of a lode mining claim are used
only to describe, define and limit property rights in the claim,
and may be laid within, upon or across the surface of patented
lode mining claims for the purpose of claiming the free and un-
appropriated ground within such lines and the veins apexing in
such ground, and of defining and securing extralateral under-
ground rights upon all such veins, where such lines: (a) are
established openly and peaceably, (b) do not embrace any larger
area of surface, claimed and unclaimed, than the law permits."
If we assume this to be a correct statement of the law, the con-
verse of it is also correct, viz.: that if the lines and monuments
of the overlapping location cannot be established openly and
peaceably, they cannot be established at all.
The point sought to be illustrated is not suggested by specula-
tion upon mere possibilities. It is well known that it is often the
case that the owner of located claims resents intrusion upon his
areas by others for any purpose, whether they are patented or
unpatented. The records of our criminal courts show many cases
where the setting of monuments and laying of boundary lines for
the sole and avowed purpose of securing subsurface values which
would otherwise be unappropriated, have led to violence and
sometimes to homicide. A single citizen armed with a Winchester
rifle can thus set at naught the decision in the Del Monte case
and every other one following it. So the local courts, con-
113o L. D., 420.
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fronted with declaration so emphatically made by the Supreme
Court in many cases, that the statute must be the sole guide in
determining the rights of mineral claimants, are often at a loss
in the effort to determine cases for which the statute seems to
make no provision because their occurrence was not anticipated
when the statute was enacted. It is not surprising, therefore, that
there should be conflicting views. For illustration: In one case a
federal court held that the extralateral portion of a vein, the apex
of which was found within the area of a triangular-shaped loca-
tion, belonged neither to the locator of that claim nor to the
owner of the adjoining claim, because it had never been granted to
either and hence could be disposed of only by legislation amenda-
tory to the present statute.
12 Considering the same question, a
state court held that inasmuch as that portion of the vein had not
bcen appropriated by the owner of the triangle and was beneath
the surface of the adjoining owner, the latter was entitled to it by
virtue of his common law right to everything beneath the sur-
face.' 3 The Supreme Court of the United States seems to ap-
prove the conclusion announced by the state court.' The failure
of Congress to make specific provision for the disposition of these
irregularly-shaped areas gives rise to these anomalies, and has
tempted the courts to supplement the statute by judicial legisla-
tion, although the authority to do so is consistently disavowed.
Would it not have been better if the court of last resort had ad-
hered strictly to the rule, so often theretofore declared, that the
statute is the only guide, and have left it to the Congress to
supply its deficiency by additional legislation? Any solution of
the difficulty so far reached by any court cannot be regarded as a
guide in any other case not identical in its facts with the one in
hand. Does it not seem an anomaly for a court to say at one
time that a locator has the exclusive right to the surface of his
location, and may protect his possession by any appropriate means.
and at another that his rights are exclusive sub inodo only? It
may be that the apparently inconsistent anrouncements made by
the Supreme Court can be reconciled upon some sounid principle,
but the condition of the law at present seems altogether
anomalous.
Theodore Brantlv.
12 Montana Co., Lira., v. Clark, 42 Fed., 626.
23 State cx rel. Anaconda C. Min. Co. v. District Court, 25 Mont.. 504:
Parrott S. & C. Co. v. Heinle, 25 Mont., x39.
14 St. Louis Miin. Co. v. Montana M in. Co., 194 U. S., 235.
